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The arrival of European settlers at the Cape in 1652 marked the beginning of what would 
become an extremely unequal society. Comparative analysis reveals that certain 
endowments exist in societies that experience a ‘persistence of inequality’. This paper 
shows that the emphasis on endowments may be overstated. A more general explanation 
allows for ‘non-tropical products’ to contribute to the rise and persistence of an elite, and 
consequently inequality. The focus shifts to the production method used in the dominant 
industry – in this case, slave labour in viticulture – and the subsequent ability of the elite to 
extend these benefits to products that were typically not associated with elite formation in 
other societies (such as wheat). The Cape Colony is used as a case study to show how the 
arrival of French settlers (with a preference for wine-making) shifted production from cattle 
farming to viticulture. A large domestic and foreign market for wine necessitated an 
increase in production volume. Given differences in fixed and variable costs, this resulted in 
knecht (wage) labour being supplanted by slave labour, an event which institutionalized the 
elite and ensured that the Cape remained a highly unequal society, with ramifications for 
present-day South Africa. 
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The arrival of European settlers at the Cape in 1652 marked the beginning of what 
would later become a highly unequal South African society. The endowments 
hypothesis put forward by Engerman et al (2000) explains the persistence of high 
inequality in newly settled societies by emphasizing two ‘prerequisite’ initial 
conditions, namely fertile land (coupled with a suitable climate) and a large native 
population. This paper extends the view of the endowments hypothesis to refocus 
attention on how industries may operate within this set of conditions. We argue that 
what is more appropriate in explaining inequality is the production function used in the 
dominant industry (which does not necessarily have to be a ‘tropical cash crop’), 
particularly in the absence of sufficient capital and arable land. The evidence suggests 
that while the endowments hypothesis may be broadly valid, the factors proposed by 
Engerman and Sokoloff are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for inequality to 
persist. 
 
The Cape Colony is used as a case study to illustrate these propositions. We use 
farmers’ tax records that were collected by the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde 
Oost-Indische Compagne or VOC) to monitor the production methods within various 
industries, using different combinations of labour types in respective periods. In 
particular, we consider the impact of the rise of viticulture on elitism, the role that 
slavery had in switching production technologies and how the combination of these 
events altered the approach in the production of other goods. 
 
The arrival of French settlers (with a preference for wine-making and supported by a 
mercantilist Dutch East India Company) resulted in an exogenous change in the 
production methods used in an economy that initially focussed only on supplying 
passing Dutch ships with fresh supplies of food. These developments increased the 
demand for labour, and necessitated the importation of large numbers of slaves, which 
were easily sourced along the routes of the passing ships. This particular path of 
expansion was followed for a number of reasons: first, wine was in high demand, both 
in the Cape and abroad, and increased production following the arrival of the French 
satisfied this need; second, while slave labour had higher initial fixed costs than wage 
labour, greater production volumes lowered the average costs of slave labour (allowing 
economies of scale to be realized). The Colony acted on these incentives and wage 
labour was substituted by slave labour. Yet, the decision to import slaves (instead of 
encouraging immigration from Europe to supplement the labour force) institutionalized 
the elite, as these economies of scale could only be exploited on the largest farms. In 
effect, the wine industry became highly concentrated in the hands of a small group of 
affluent viticulturalists. Even with a small native population and relatively infertile soil, 
institutions evolved that resemble the Engerman-Sokoloff initial endowments 
hypothesis, giving rise to an elite that would protect its economic position (at the cost of 
other groups). These institutions, later to be reinforced by the mining industry, would 
ultimately have an effect on present-day South Africa, which has become one of the 
most unequal economies today. 
 
Furthermore, the production changes in the wine industry served as a catalyst for a 
metamorphosis in wheat production. The Engermann-Sokoloff conjecture contrasts 
wheat-producing societies with others, where wheat-producers are usually considered to  2
be more equal. While this was true during the early period at the Cape, the economies of 
scale in wine production were also harnessed in wheat production, so that the large 
slave force was used to further advance the position of the elite by this mode of 
production. In line with the more conventional predictions, rye and barley production 
(along with cattle) was not affected by the exogenous change in the economy.  
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the Engerman-Sokoloff 
endowments hypothesis and proposes a simple model in order to generalize these 
observations to societies with slightly different circumstances. Section 3 highlights the 
initial conditions prevalent at the Cape, while Section 4 provides an overview of the 
situation of the Cape elite. Section 5 discusses the data, while section 6 presents 
empirical evidence to support the adjusted version of the endowments hypothesis. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2  A simple model of an augmented endowments hypothesis 
The endowments hypothesis is a dominant view put forward to explain the rise and 
persistence of inequality in newly settled regions. As the main proponents of this 
hypothesis, Engerman et al. (2000) and Engerman and Sokoloff (2002; 2003; 2005) 
have stated two preconditions for the rise of inequality in a newly settled society: 
‘climate and soil conditions that were extremely well suited for growing crops’ or 
‘extensive native populations’ (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002: 3). The colonies located 
in the tropics were endowed with fertile conditions conducive for growing cash crops, 
specifically sugar, coffee, cocoa, bananas, tobacco and rubber that are subject to large 
economies of scale. To realize economies of scale required labour, either sourced from 
the local population (where this was available) or through slave imports. Moreover, 
according to Engerman and Sokoloff, in more temperate zones, the availability of a 
large native population may give rise to industries that are highly labour-intensive. In 
both settings, as industries that favour labour-intensive production develops, an elite 
secures economic power which it maintains by creating institutions that promote the 
status quo, i.e., mostly through securing property rights and limiting access to 
education. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, these production functions 
resulted in high initial inequality between (colonial) land owners and (native or slave) 
labourers. In contrast, the temperate zones of the British Americas were generally not 
conducive to cash crops and also lacked a large native population. In these territories, 
institutions developed that promoted equity, lowering inequality and improving growth 
opportunities. 
 
The initial differences in factor endowments is thus key in understanding the way 
institutions evolved. Over time, institutions would develop in resource rich regions that 
would reinforce the high levels of inequality, compared to the more egalitarian 
institutions in North America. Thus, ultimately, the initial wealth distribution was 
determined by the early endowments of land and labour. This hypothesis is tested by 
Easterly (2007) who finds that certain types of agricultural endowments do, in fact, 
explain higher inequality which, ultimately, retards economic development. 
 
We posit that this perspective is too limited. While the Engerman and Sokoloff 
hypothesis has been critized on various grounds (Coatsworth 2005; 2008; Nugent and 
Robinson 2005), we argue that the focus on agricultural endowments as a narrow 
explanatory factor that determines inequality – together with a large native population –  3
may be oversimplified. Following standard trade theory, the supply (endowments of 
land, labour, capital and technology creating a comparative advantage) and demand 
(both local and foreign) may determine the dominant industry that emerges (cash crops 
in the tropics, mining in Mexico, Peru and Bolivia, and wheat and maize in North 
America). To be sure, fertile conditions, as Engerman and Sokoloff put it, are important 
for the production of certain commodities (as confirmed by Easterly (2007)). Yet, we 
posit that a dominant industry arose not simply because of the specific endowments or 
attributes (on the supply side). Rising product demand, as in the case of the Cape 
Colony, may also explain why certain industries flourished. 
 
The focus on a large native population to exploit economies of scale may also be too 
narrow. While the availability of slaves (or a large native population) was not a cause of 
inequality, as shown by Nunn (2007), the prolonged availability of a large and relatively 
inexpensive labour force, be it from native or slave labour, reduced the costs of slave 
labour vis-à-vis wage labour. In the absence of less expensive wage labour or capital, 
plantation owners therefore made an efficient production decision to use slave labour. 
However, importing slaves had social and political consequences (one could say that it 
imposed negative externalities), reinforcing the economic power of the elite (owners) 
and resulting in persistent institutions that protected their position. 
 
We show below that the introduction of viticulture at the Cape caused a greater demand 
for labour, resulting in higher slave imports. While this is not inconsistent with the 
Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis per se (as one could envisage a non-trapical cash crop 
that makes profitable use of slavery), it does suggest that inequality does not simply 
depend on either tropical conditions or a large native population, the two preconditions 
defined by Engerman and Sokoloff. However, we also show that the importation of 
slaves increased not only the labour-intensity of viticulture (and the subsequent 
economies of scale), but also that of wheat production at the Cape. This finding is 
inconsistent with the Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis. We find that slave production of 
wheat at the Cape, different to British America, seems to have intensified over the 
period. While economies of scale were modest in wheat production, the 
complementarity between wine and wheat production ensured the dominance of an elite, 
the persistence of severe inequality, and institutions that secured its survival. 
 
We incorporate these amendments to the endowments-inequality hypothesis into a 
simple theoretical model, drawing on the classic paper by Paul David in explaining the 
mechanization of reaping in the American Midwest (David 1966). We substitute 
David’s production methods (between the scythe and sickle, and the reaper) with two 
types of labour available at the Cape – knecht (European wage) labour and slave 
(capital) labour.1 Knecht labour exhibits low initial fixed costs, but relatively higher 
variable costs. As knecht labourers were European immigrants (often Company 
officials), they required no initial investment. Their wages were, however, above the 
subsistence costs of slaves (de Chavonnes 1918). Slave labour had high fixed costs (the 
price of slaves often exceeded the annual wage of a soldier in the Company) but 
relatively lower variables costs. 
 
                                                 
1  In this context, slave labour may be seen as a form of capital, which has to be purchased (fixed cost) 
and maintained (variable cost).  4
Figure 1 plots the average total cost curves for knecht and slave labour, based on the 
fixed and variable cost structures noted above. Both average cost curves reach a 
minimum at different respective production volumes; knecht labour at Qk and slave 
labour at Qs. A different optimal production volume exists for each type of labour; the 
minimum cost for slave labour is attained at a larger production volume than for knecht 
labour. This implies that at low production volumes, knecht labour would be utilized in 
production where economies of scale for this input is evident (before Qk). Slave labour 
is not employed at all at these low levels of output owing to high fixed costs. However, 
as the variable costs of wage labour dominate, diseconomies of scale are realized using 
this mode of production (between Qk and Qe). At this moderate level of production, the 
incentive to substitute to slave labour becomes prominent, but is limited by the ability to 
cover the high fixed costs of slave labour. Therefore, high demand for products and the 
ability to expand supply is a prerequisite for this substitution to commence. Given that 
the VOC was a monopsonist that regulated prices, many farmers did not have the 
incentive to embark on this transition while their operations remained sufficiently small. 
At a certain production volume (Qe) there is no difference between employing knecht or 
slave labour. Beyond Qe, using slave labour is the more efficient production method, 
with distinct economies of scale allowing large farmers to extend their production to 
very high levels (up to Qs). Effectively, the new production method shifts the limits of 
the economies of scale that can be realized with wage labour to much higher levels 
(given that farmers have the capacity to move to these levels of production). 
 
We posit that the initial phase of Dutch settlement (pre-1688) was characterized by low 
production volumes, with farmers using predominantly knechts. The land was not suited 
to plantation farming as in the tropics, nor were there any known precious mineral 
deposits (diamonds and gold would only be discovered roughly two centuries later in 
the interior). Cattle ranching and wheat farming were initially the dominant industries, 
with the main purpose to supply the passing ships. French Huguenots arrived in 1688, 
changing the dominant industry from cattle to wine production. Domestic and foreign 
demand for wine was high. An increase in production volume, however, required more 
labour. Slaves substituted knecht labour as production volumes increased beyond the 
relevant thresholds. To realize the large economies of scale on wine farms, however, 
slaves had to be concentrated on large farms. This allowed elites to emerge and 
inequality increased. The Engerman-Sokoloff premise therefore manifested, but by a 
somewhat different mechanism to their original hypothesis. Furthermore, wheat 
production trailed viticulture, being somewhat anomalous in the context of the broader 
Engermann-Sokoloff framework. 
 
The rest of this chapter aims to uncover these assertions with empirical support. We 
show that viticulture supplanted cattle and wheat farming after the arrival of the French 
in 1688 and that slave labour then substituted for knecht labour. We furthermore 
illustrate that economies of scale in wine did emerge after a period of transition, which 
entrenched an elite. These assertions are framed within the existing literature and recent 
quantitative work (Guelke and Shell 1983; Fourie and von Fintel 2010). 
3  Initial conditions at the Cape 
The Cape Colony was first settled in 1652 by the Dutch East India Company (VOC) to 
serve as a ‘halfway’ refreshment station along its trading route from Europe to India. 
Prior to this period, some European ships had passed, but no formal attempts at settling  5
the territory had been undertaken. At the same time, the local Khoekhoe population 
lived a nomadic lifestyle. The period under study therefore commences at a time when 
no formal agriculture had yet been established, nor any formal institutions that governed 
economic allocation. Therefore, the initial conditions which the Dutch found are an 
important feature in understanding the trajectory along which this society progressed. 
More importantly, the manner in which the Dutch responded to these circumstances 
reveals how institutions that favour an elite can allow inequality to continue well into 
the future.  
 
When the first nine Company servants were released to become farmers in 1657, the 
commander of the station, Jan van Riebeeck, had envisioned a community of tight-knit 
European farmers around the fort, supplying the settlement and passing ships with fresh 
produce, meat and fuel (wood). Van Riebeeck thought the Mediterranean climate at the 
Cape to be ideal for small-scale, intensive agriculture, much like that of European 
farms, with crops planted on a rotational basis and a limited holding of cattle, from 
which manure was collected for fertilizer (Guelke 1980). Seven years later, however, 15 
farmers inhabited the entire area which Van Riebeeck hoped would support more than a 
thousand families. The farmers – nearly all of them former Company servants – found 
the climate and soil less than ideal for intensive farming (especially the strong south-
westerly winds that time and again destroyed promising crops). They had little previous 
experience of intensive farming and possessed nearly no working knowledge of the 
terrain, soil and seasonal weather patterns of the Cape. Many farmers were also 
discouraged by the continuous theft of cattle and dangers posed by the native Khoekhoe 
population (Giliomee 2003). This setting therefore does not coincide with the ‘fertile 
conditions’ associated with the endowments hypothesis. 
 
In addition, high trade barriers imposed by the Company as a result of its mercantilist 
approach to international trade provided few incentives for farmers to invest in their 
farms (de Kock 1924). Low prices offered by the monopsonist Company offered 
farmers little opportunity for economic profits on their investments. Coupled with the 
high risks attached to agriculture and the availability of relatively free land, many 
farmers consequently turned to pastoral farming, expanding the borders of the Colony 
and curbing Van Riebeeck’s vision. Given the scarcity of (native) labour and capital and 
the restrictions imposed on prices, production shifted to cattle for which land (which 
was relatively freely available) was the most important input. 
 
Yet, the demand from the passing ships for fresh produce (especially wheat) exceeded 
what the Company could produce from its own gardens (up until the eighteenth 
century). While final prices were kept low, the Company decided to lower the input 
costs of farmers to incentivize production for these purposes. Small loans were provided 
to the farmers for essential capital equipment (such as cattle, seeds and tools), although 
this was barely enough to improve the farmers’ precarious position (de Kock 1924). 
More importantly, the Company also began importing slave labour from Angola, and 
later Mozambique, Madagascar, Indonesia and India (Armstrong and Worden 1988), 
although the first slaves were mostly used for Company purposes close to the fort.2 
                                                 
2  Local Khoekhoe labour, although probably of greater value than foreign slave labour because of their 
knowledge about local conditions, could by decree of the Dutch East India Company not be enslaved. 
As European settlers moved into the interior, the Khoekhoe migrated further North or East, died from 
European diseases, notably smallpox, or opted to stay on the farms of Europeans in exchange for their 
services, either as labourers or as servants.  6
 
A group of 155 French Huguenots arrived at the Cape in 1688 and settled in the 
relatively fertile area west of the first mountain ranges (Botha 1939; Leipoldt 1942). 
The French took up viticulture (although viticulture was not restricted to the Huguenots, 
and not all Huguenots were viticulturalists). The wine industry was encouraged by the 
Company, both for local consumption (including the sailors and soldiers on the passing 
ships) but also as an export product to Batavia, in competition with French exports. In 
fact, Boshoff and Fourie (2008; 2010) show that the arriving ships at the Cape had a 
strong impact on the wheat and wine industry. During the eighteenth century, on 
average 10,000 sailors and soldiers arrived annually at the Cape to refresh after months 
at sea. Local wine, especially, was in high demand for immediate consumption and for 
the remaining part of the journey. Wine was also exported, mostly to Batavia because of 
the poor quality. Yet, some farms (notably Constantia), gained a reputation as high-
quality wine makers. Napoleon, by way of anecdote, frequently requested Constantia 
wine while exiled on St. Helena. The demand for wine was therefore an important 
determinant of its widespread cultivation after the Huguenot arrival. 
 
Viticulture, however, required a large labour force and was an industry subject to 
economies of scale if cheap labour with low variable costs could be sourced. The 
demand for labour was satisfied by increasing slave imports (in all probability, also 
reducing the price of slaves – the fixed costs – although there are as yet few time-series 
records of slave prices for this period). In the aftermath of a smallpox epidemic in 1713 
that ravaged the Cape population – killing nearly 9 out of every 10 Khoekhoe according 
to some estimates (Armstrong and Worden 1988; Giliomee 2003) – the VOC requested 
a response from the Cape Council of Policy on whether additional European settlers 
were needed at the Cape. A year later, in 1717, seven of the eight members of the 
Council of Policy petitioned the Company to discourage European immigration in 
favour of slave imports. The reasons that were given support the notion of elite 
persistence: the governor, M.P. de Chavonnes, noted the already high levels of poverty 
among some European settlers (‘I am of opinion that more [European] people are not 
needed, especially as it is feared that poverty may increase’) and the lower cost of slave 
imports (‘I am of opinion that the former [farm-labourers] would be more troublesome 
and expensive than slaves’) (de Chavonnes 1918: 88). The shift from cattle to wine and 
wheat production, therefore, induced a growing demand for labour. Slave labour, as the 
low-cost alternative, was preferred to wage labour from Europe.  
 
By 1720 the entire area west of the first mountain ranges was inhabited by European 
settlers. Agriculture (mostly wheat and wine) constituted the major industry, except in 
Cape Town where some secondary and tertiary activity – especially in service of the 
passing ships – occurred. Slave labour was the most important input into agriculture and 
slaves were widely dispersed across the rural Cape (Guelke and Shell 1983). 
4  Evidence of a rising elite at the Cape 
The distribution of wealth and income at the Cape has so far received scant attention in 
the economic history (and particularly the cliometric) literature. The qualitative 
historical perspective has mostly highlighted the plight of poor farmers and the adverse 
conditions which seemed to persist (de Kock 1924; Guelke 1980; Schutte 1980). Yet 
some historical records document evidence of a rising elite after the turn of the century. 
Mentzel (1921), a German immigrant, divided the Cape society of the 1730s into four  7
groups. While the first group included wealthy Company officials and merchants living 
in Cape Town, the second group were colonists who owned large farms and lived 
lavishly. The third and fourth groups were poorer settlers, either wheat and wine 
farmers who owned few slaves, or pastoral farmers of the interior. While many farmers 
struggled to make a living, it is clear that a small group of farmers became exceptionally 
wealthy (Giliomee 2003).  
 
Further proof of a growing elite is provided by the imposition of sumptuary laws in 
1755. The Governor and his council issued a plakkaat (ordinance) with the view of 
‘limiting the number of horses, carriages, jewels, slaves, etc., which an individual of this 
or that rank might possess’ (Giliomee 2003: 30). Although similar ordinances had been 
issued earlier, the High Government in Batavia noted in the preamble to the 1755 
ordinance that the ‘splendour and pomp among various Company servants and burghers 
… reached such a peak of scandal’ that the issue had to be dealt with more seriously 
(Ross 1999: 9). This sumptuary law was concerned with the display which was allowed 
on the horses, carriages and guides, and the number of horses used. 
 
Visitors also noted the expensive taste of some farmers. In 1783 a traveller to the region 
wrote that on several farms he had observed ‘nothing except signs of affluence and 
prosperity, to the extent that, in addition to splendours and magnificence in clothes and 
carriages, the houses are filled with elegant furniture and the tables decked with 
silverware and served by tidily clothed slaves’ (Naudé 1950). De Kock (1924: 35) 
argues that such luxurious habits were, in part, a consequence of the social conditions 
created by slavery. 
 
This qualitative evidence is supported by the only thorough investigation into the gentry 
of the Cape Colony by Guelke and Shell (1983). Guelke and Shell (1983: 275) rely on 
aggregated data of the opgaafrollen (as introduced in the next section) to show that the 
minimal majority of 1731 had considerably greater capital assets per household than 
their counterparts in 1705, although ‘the distribution of wealth remained virtually 
unchanged’. They argue that the increased costs of arable farming (the increase in the 
price of land and labour, the latter because of the smallpox epidemic of 1713), 
combined with a generally weak market for grain and wine, put pressure on farmers to 
improve the efficiency of their landholdings. According to Guelke and Shell (1983), 
given the extensive agricultural system, such improvement involved getting the most 
out of each unit of labour rather than increasing output per unit of land. This strategy 
therefore required the realization of economies of scale in production, which could only 
be achieved by intensive use of slaves3 and the amalgamation of farms into larger units 
that were concentrated in ownership. ‘In the period from 1705 to 1731 the ownership of 
freehold land was increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small elite. In 1731, each 
member of the minimal majority had, on average, three freehold farm properties’ 
(Guelke and Shell 1983). 
 
Using a per capita asset index for the period 1663 to 1757 to measure inequality in the 
Cape Colony, Fourie and von Fintel (2010) find empirical support for the Guelke and 
Shell (1983) hypothesis of a rise in elitism after 1705. Although they find evidence of 
declining inequality after the 1700s, this can be explained by the increase in wealth 
                                                 
3  The use of wage labour meant that the economies of scale that could be realized with this input 
stopped short of the high levels of production that could be achieved by using slaves.  8
indicators of the poorer section of the distribution. However, a rise in inequality is 
discernable towards the latter end of the sample, and is driven by the sharp increases in 
the wealth of a small group of affluent farmers since the 1730s. 
5  Measuring and defining the elite 
This analysis implements detailed household level data that was collected for the 
evaluation of tax burdens by the VOC authorities, and have been transcribed from 
company archival sources. The opgaafrollen, as they were called, spanned the entire 
Dutch occupation, and also extended into British rule. Here the datasets from 1663 to 
1773 are analysed. This timeframe includes the period shortly after the Dutch settled at 
the Cape in 1652, then continues into the period of transition after the arrival of the 
French Huguenots in 1688, and then traces the period in which both the wine industry 
and slavery expanded until 1773.  
 
Many households specialized in subsistence non-market production because of the 
strongly centralized role of the VOC in organizing markets and transactions. For this 
reason most figures are not measured in monetary values, but represent the fluctuations 
in production of various goods, as related to the emergence of an elite and their 
production inputs. This section continues to establish which indicators are important to 
analyse the hypothesis in light of data limitations. As shown in Fourie and von Fintel 
(2010), a combination of many indicators can be used to distinguish between the elite 
and the rest of the population. However, the focus here shifts to the production 
processes implemented by these households. The full set of indicators is discussed in 
that paper, although a few are briefly highlighted below. 
 
The opgaafrollen did not record the size and types of farms that were cultivated. Given 
that fertile land was one of the ‘prerequisite’ endowments for inequality in the 
Engerman and Sokoloff hypothesis, the data does not allow a full critique of the 
mechanisms they propose. It is, however, known that the freehold land granted by the 
VOC to farmers was coupled with restrictions that meant that burghers did not have 
entirely free choice in the acquisition and sale of this property (de Kock 1924: 30). 
Furthermore, the subsequent loan farm system implied that property rights were not 
cemented in the colony. This suggests that this particular endowment may not have been 
as critical in determining the emergence of elites. Information on labour inputs (the 
other initial endowment) is, however, recorded in detail in the inventories. This is, in 
contrast to land, an input that could be freely required in the market – particularly in the 
market for slaves. Furthermore, slavery is known to have been a strong predictor of 
farming success, particularly in wine and wheat production. In particular, Armstrong 
and Worden (1988: 137) note that ‘... [wheat and grain farmers] were the most efficient 
at exploiting their slaves largely because they made more intensive use of them 
throughout the year’. They confirm that the correlation between slave ownership and 
output was the strongest in these sectors. The number of European wage labourers 
employed by each household is also recorded in the data. No further characteristics of 
workers of either type are available, so that within each of these types of labour, 
homogeneity is assumed. 
 
Some portions of this study rely on slave ownership to measure the elite group in the 
Cape Colony. This decision is supported in the historical literature, which suggests that 
slave ownership was a strong indicator of wealth. In their definition of the Cape gentry  9
(elite), Guelke and Shell (1983: 270) use wealth in land, slaves and livestock as 
measures to estimate the size of the elite, although they maintain that ‘the exact limit of 
the gentry classes is difficult to define using quantitative measures alone’. Giliomee 
(2003) is more definite, prescribing a lower bound of 26 slaves per household to define 
the wealthiest category of farmers. Below, an elitist household is defined by three 
measures to circumvent the subjectivity of this arbitrary threshold. Farming households 
owning more than 15, 20 and 25 slaves define the respective criteria to be considered as 
a part of the gentry. However, the commencement of large-scale slave imports more 
clearly alters the labour intensity of economic activity, and as a result, the structure and 
growth of output. Slavery as an input into this analysis is more important. 
 
Apart from labour inputs, agricultural indicators dominate the data. This paper uses the 
outputs rather than the inputs to gauge the economies of scale (with respect to slaves 
and  knechts) in each of these sectors over time. The number of vines planted and 
leaguers of wine produced annually are recorded in detail and form the central focus of 
this paper. In addition, the number of muids of grains sown and reaped (wheat, barley 
and rye), are available for analysis. The possession of livestock (cattle, sheep and pigs) 
are also investigated, particularly because frontier districts were dominated by this type 
of farming. The number of horses is also included in the data: while highly correlated 
with slavery and elitism, this is not considered alongside the other livestock variables, 
as they were important mostly for private use only, and not in the production process or 
for sale in the market. 
 
It is evident that most variables relate to agriculture, because the opgaafrollen were 
designed to impose taxes on these outputs. However, as noted in Fourie and von Fintel 
(2010), a large section of this population located mainly in Cape Town registered zeroes 
for all of the outputs mentioned here. However, these households possessed slaves and 
weapons (not used in this analysis) and also employed knechts. It is therefore evident 
that other (non-agricultural) business activities are not fully captured in the data, and 
that these households are likely to constitute a ‘non-farmer’ population that operated 
mainly in other commercial activities. Very little useful information is available for this 
non-farmer population, making it difficult to establish whether they were engaged in 
activities that secured their positions as a gentry class. However, in light of the 
theoretical drivers of elitism in settler societies, we are interested in establishing how 
economies of scale have manifested for farmers to secure and maintain their balance of 
power in economic exchange. Henceforth we only consider this sub-population. 
6  Results and analysis 
We test the hypothesis that the production method shifted from knecht to slave labour 
after the arrival of the French Huguenots in 1688. As viticulture supplanted cattle 
farming – and the production volume increased – we would expect to see the use of 
slave labour increasing vis-à-vis knecht labour. We also test whether the increase in 
slave labour was concentrated on larger farms in order to utilize economies of scale, 
causing a rising elite and higher inequality. To do this, we use various opgaafrollen 
from 1663 to 1773. For both hypotheses, we consider descriptive statistics which are 
later enriched by distributional analyses. We also derive micro-level partial correlations 
between (knecht and slave) labour and output types in respective periods. This analysis 
illustrates that a shift from knecht to slave labour preceded the realization of economies 
of scale once wine farms became large and slave labour used more intensively. These  10
correlations control for the fact that multiple outputs were produced by the same 
workers. 
6.1 Descriptive  statistics 
 
Using the simple Giliomee (2003) definitions of elitism based on the numbers of slaves 
owned, it is evident from the descriptive statistics (Table 1 and Table 2) that the 
beginning of the eighteenth century marked a turning point in the proportion of farmers 
that employed large numbers of slaves (and as a result signalled the advent of a rising 
gentry). During this period the number of knechts (or paid European labour) employed 
per farmer was in long-term decline. After 1731, when the average farmer owned in 
excess of six slaves, knechts became a virtually insignificant form of labour. This 
suggests that slave labour substituted paid labour at the Cape, which corresponds to the 
simple model explained above and qualitative evidence (the decision by the Council of 
Policy in 1717 to discourage European immigration in favour of slave imports (Reports 
of de Chavonnes 1918)). 
 
The turn of the eighteenth century not only signified an expansion of slavery, but 
coincided with the period shortly after viticulture emerged at the Cape. This increase in 
slave ownership, however, is not directly mirrored by similar increases in the wine 
production of the average farmer. However, as shown below in the distributional 
analysis, the maturation of the wine industry did not necessarily benefit the average 
farmer, but promoted the formation of elites over time. It is furthermore evident that 
after 1738, farmers held relatively fewer heads of cattle, indicating the decline of this 
particular industry (which is also true at points in the distribution away from the 
average). In sum, it is evident that there is an apparent concurrent increase in slavery 
and the emergence of the wine industry, while other forms of agriculture declined 
relatively. 
6.2  Estimates of labour intensity of various outputs 
 
We now turn to estimates of (knecht and slave) labour intensity of various industries 
across time. The estimates in Table 3 and Table 4 present OLS equations that ‘explain’ 
slavery. These functions are somewhat unusual compared to the norm. Usually it is 
assumed that labour (as a production input) influences the production of goods, rather 
than the other way around (as implied by the estimates). However, the estimates 
presented below are not conducted to infer causal relationships, but to establish the size 
of the conditional partial correlation between the size of farmers’ slave labour force and 
the composition of its various production outputs.4 We regress the total number of 
slaves owned by each farmer5 on the various outputs obtained from the land.6 Each of 
                                                 
4  It is of course possible to simply calculate bivariate correlations between slaves and particular forms 
of production. However, it is not possible to apportion slaves to particular outputs in the dataset. For 
this reason we wish to control for other outputs in determining the correlation between the use of 
slavery and particular forms of production. 
5  Note that the sample has been restricted to those households in the opgaafrollen that had positive 
amounts for at least one agricultural indicator. 
6  We exclude horses, as very few farmers reared horses other than for their own use. They were 
furthermore not exported. However, when this measure is included, it has a strong statistically  11
the output quantities was standardized7 so that coefficients may be interpreted as the 
relationship between one standard deviation of the production input and the number of 
slaves employed in production. This approach allows us to compare directly which 
output type employed more labour, given that the other goods were produced. The 
reason we follow this unconventional approach, is because there is no way of inferring 
how labour was allocated to the production of different goods with the raw household 
level data. However, a high coefficient suggests that the relevant product was cultivated 
using more slaves. The further benefit of this approach is that we are able to see which 
types of production contributed most to the rise of the elite in different periods (by the 
supposition that slave ownership signified elitism). However, as a result of this 
‘incorrect’ specification, the automatic danger of endogeneity arises. The lack of any 
exogenous information in this dataset precludes any sensible instrumental variable 
estimation.8 
 
The first estimates present a pooled OLS model for the entire sample period (1663-
1773).9 To establish whether the impact has remained stable over time, OLS estimates 
are repeated separately for each year. An increasing coefficient over time suggests that 
the respective product has become more slave intensive, while small coefficients 
suggest that slave labour was not important in this mode of production.10 Declining 
coefficients can indicate different underlying processes: the first possibility is a 
substitution of labour away from that industry towards another, while the second is that 
economies of scale were realized, as burghers that owned large farms learnt how to ‘get 
the most out of each slave’ (Guelke and Shell 1983). The former, however, is only 
                                                                                                                                             
significant relationship with slaves. We should not make the same inferences with regards to these 
coefficients (as with the other products), but simply acknowledge that just as slaves served as an 
indicator of elitism, so did horses. This is evident in the limitations that were placed on the illustrious 
horse carriages under the sumptuary laws. Results are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of horses; 
the former sets of estimates are not presented here to conserve space.  
7  We follow two standardization approaches. First, we standardize each of the outputs in each year 
which enables comparison across products for each cross section. However, a second approach is 
required, given that the standard deviation of most products changes across time and loses its meaning 
in an intertemporal context. For instance, the standard deviation of wine increases across time 
(signifying higher levels of inequality in the production of this commodity) as is evident in Table 1. 
The second approach standardizes across the pooled sample to enable intertemporal comparability. 
8  We further use ‘horses’ as the dependent variable to test the robustness of the association between 
various industries and elitism (these results are not reported here, as they do not contribute to the 
understanding of the production method component of elite formation). Indeed, the sumptuary laws 
restricted the numbers of horses and carriages owned by the growing elite, and this therefore serves as 
a good indicator of gentry status. Using horses as the dependent variable supports the notion that the 
elite emerged from the group of wine farmers. While horses were sometimes used in the production 
process and would thus give rise to the same endogeneity problems as slaves, at the Cape they were 
often used to display prestige rather than to produce goods. (The sandy soil of the Cape flats made 
horses inefficient as a means of transport with farmers preferring oxen as draft animals). Therefore 
causality from production to the possession of horses is more plausible, suggesting that the large 
correlations between viticulture and slavery are indeed an indication of elite formation. 
9 The  opgaafrollen can be synthesized into a panel dataset, though the reliability of the matches is not 
sure without more careful genealogical research. Nevertheless, fixed effects estimates over this period 
present a similar picture to the pooled OLS estimates. 
10 Some coefficients were negative, which makes no economic sense. However, each of these cases was 
statistically insignificant, so that by implication no slaves were implemented in that specific mode of 
production.  12
possible if we notice that another industry’s labour intensity rises at the same time as the 
decline in the initially labour intensive industry.  
 
From the pooled OLS it becomes clear that the wine, wheat, cattle and sheep production 
are strongly related to the use of slave labour over the whole period, while the other 
forms of agriculture were less important. The pooled model suggests that a one standard 
deviation increase in wine production required about 2.5 additional slaves, compared to 
just more than 2 slaves per standard deviation of wheat production. For livestock these 
figures are substantially lower. First, therefore, it is evident that the wine and wheat 
industries contributed most to the establishment of the elite (measured by slave 
possession).  
 
Given, however, that this economy was still in flux, with new areas being settled and 
new crops cultivated, these ratios were likely to change over the sample period. Indeed, 
viticulture was only reported in any significant numbers from 1695. This followed the 
establishment of Drakenstein with the arrival of French winemakers in 1688. Similar 
results for each cross section are presented in subsequent columns of Table 3.11  
 
Before discussing the behaviour in the various industries, it is important to note that the 
intercept has risen consistently over the period, except for slight declines from the 1750s 
when the sumptuary laws were imposed. This represents the average number of slaves 
that were used in production other than the outputs included in the model. In 1663 
insignificant numbers of slaves were used outside of the production methods controlled 
for, but by 1738, this reach a peak of 7.5 slaves. This highlights the extent to which 
slavery became an important part of the household, and not only as a production input. 
This corroborates Naudé’s (1950) qualitative evidence of well-dressed slaves serving in 
the homes of elites. 
 
For the various products, it is evident that for the period 1663 to 1695, few coefficients 
appear statistically significant, so that it is difficult to discern any association between 
slave labour and all forms of production. This coincides with a period of rising 
inequality in the Cape Colony (Fourie and von Fintel 2010): it was, however, not 
attributed to a rising gentry, but to the constant arrivals of immigrants who were 
relatively poor12 compared to the existing farming population. Therefore this period 
signifies a non slave-intensive economy, but also one in which not much economic 
progress was yet registered. This time coincides with a period where the high fixed 
costs of slaves and the infancy of the wine industry meant that economies of scale (with 
respect to slaves) could not yet be realized (before Qk in Figure 1). 
 
The beginning of the eighteenth century was the commencement of a period of 
declining inequality, which coincided with limits on European immigration. It is evident 
in the estimates that this also coincided with a structural break in production methods, 
                                                 
11 These results were all replicated using quantile regressions that centred the model around the 
respective quantiles that were approximately close to 15, 20 and 25 slaves (our thresholds of elitism). 
As is evident in the distributional analysis, focusing on explaining the average farmer is not 
representative of the underlying processes. However, the empirical results do not lead to different 
conclusions anywhere along the distribution and are not shown here. 
12 They arrived with no assets, but over time – through asset accumulation – could converge on the 
earlier generations of migrants.  13
with slaves becoming more important. In 1700 one standard deviation of wine 
production required 1.79 slaves, while cattle production was particularly labour 
intensive, with one standard deviation of heads of cattle associated with 2.97 slaves. In 
1712 wheat farming appeared to join these ranks, requiring 1.70 slaves per standard 
deviation of production. Most of these figures rose or remained high over the period. To 
clearly discern the dynamic, Figure 2A plots the relevant standardized coefficients 
(based on the pooled sample’s standard deviation) against time. The picture that 
emerges is that prior to the eighteenth century, slaves were most intensively used in 
cattle rearing (though in many periods the coefficients were not statistically significant, 
suggesting that slave labour was not effectively exploited in any form of production 
during this time). However, after the arrival of viticulture, attention diverted, so that 
slaves were substituted to wine and wheat production (now with large and statistically 
significant impacts, suggesting that the introduction of viticulture coincided with the 
more intensive use of slave labour at the Cape). In particular, the period from 1712-
1738 saw the wine industry expanding and maturing, and the vehicle appeared to be the 
intensive use of slave labour to establish the viability of this new product. This 
coincides with a shift in production volumes from Qk to Qe  in Figure 1, where 
diseconomies of scale emerged for wage labour, but where the average cost of slaves 
still exceeded those of knechts. A gradual course of substitution followed, but only 
where either production volume increased to negate the high fixed costs of slaves, or the 
fixed costs became sufficiently low to switch to the new production methods.  
 
From about 1741 (a period when inequality started increasing as a result of a rising 
gentry), slave usage per standard deviation of wine production moderated. This signifies 
the commencement of economies of scale (in terms of slaves) in the lifecycle of the 
industry. Indeed, as shown below, the later years saw a smaller proportion of farmers in 
wine production. However, wine farmers started cultivating larger numbers of vines. 
This picture suggests the intensive use of slavery was required to establish the industry, 
but that this was followed by economies of scale that benefitted a relatively small 
proportion of large producers that were to constitute a new elite. This point signifies 
large scale production (approximating Qs in Figure 1), where the fixed costs of slaves 
become negligible relative to the output that they produce.  
 
Figure 2B presents the analysis when standardizing coefficients by the standard 
deviation of each year (full results are omitted). While the increase in slave intensity in 
the fledgling stages of the wine industry remains, the subsequent economies of scale are 
not as dramatic as in Figure 2A. Nevertheless, it does appear that this evidence remains 
regardless of the estimation strategy. However, the benefit of this view is that other 
trends emerge that are also found in unstandardized estimates. First it is evident that the 
slave intensity of cattle and wheat production track each other (at low levels) prior to 
the introduction of viticulture. For cattle there appears to be a somewhat muted and 
constant trajectory thereafter, again confirming that this industry did not use slaves 
intensively relative to the other industries. Although the gradual dominance of wine 
production over the period is maintained, it furthermore appears that the wine industry 
appeared to have a spillover effect on wheat production. The latter’s slave intensity also 
increased somewhat until the 1740s and aided its massive expansion (as noted below). 
 
The entire exercise was repeated for other types of labour: knechts (hired European 
servants) and own household members. Across the whole sample period, very few 
coefficients were statistically significant. Therefore, a similar pattern for slave and other  14
types of labour occurs in the period before the arrival of the French and the wine 
industry, and prior to immigration restrictions. In contrast, the significant use of slave 
labour (as opposed to the continued low uptake of other forms of labour) in the wine 
and wheat sectors after the beginning of the eighteenth century is, in this light, 
indicative of a structural break in these industries alone. This was induced only by the 
intensive use of slaves following the arrival of the Huguenots, which eventually allowed 
economies of scale to arise.  
6.3 Distributional  analyses 
 
To establish that most of these changes in productivity were associated with the elite, it 
is necessary to consider the (upper tails of the) distributions of the various outputs and 
slavery. Kernel estimates of probability distributions illustrate the movements of modes 
and the weights of the upper and lower tails over time, while empirical cumulative 
distributions indicate whether intertemporal movements were stochastically dominant 
across the entire distribution.13 
 
Figure 3A shows that from the turn of the eighteenth century the immigration and slave 
policy of the Dutch East India Company first allowed the slave labour force to expand 
rapidly without requiring an exogenous increase in the settler population to sustain 
growth in production. It is evident that the bottom weight of the distribution declined 
across time, but by 1700 a long upper tail emerged (and grew thereafter), suggesting 
that many farmers had access to large numbers of slaves by this period. Turning to 
Figure 3B, it is evident that in most years only about 40 per cent of farmers did not own 
slaves.14 It is evident, however, that the post-1731 period signifies stochastic 
dominance, with all percentiles possessing more slaves in that period. 
 
The distribution of knecht employment also changed over time, although not in the same 
manner as slaves (Figure 7). In 1678 about 70 per cent of households did not employ 
these workers (the lowest figure across the period), while some households employed in 
excess of 10 knechts. This shows that this form of labour was somewhat important at the 
beginning of the settlement. However, by 1773 more than 90 per cent of farmers did not 
employ this form of labour. At the turn of the century some households employed 
nearly 30 of these workers. This was, however, a turning point, with the discouraging of 
European immigration and the concurrent move to import more slaves. It is evident that 
in addition to the declining proportion of households employing any knechts at all, the 
upper tail progressively crept downwards, so that larger households also employed very 
few hired workers. In comparison with the large numbers of slaves employed by the 
elite in these later periods, the role of knechts was diminished to insignificance, with a 
clear substitution away from this form of labour to the intensive use of cheap slaves.  
 
The distribution of vines planted (Figure 4A) offers an indication of the size of wine 
farms. In 1692, farms were still relatively small (despite some ‘elite’ farmers cultivating 
                                                 
13 Refer to ‘poverty dominance’ analysis (see Fields (2001), for instance), though in this context we 
denote stochastic dominance to mean ‘better endowed across all quantiles’. 
14 1692 is the exception, when more than 80 per cent of farmers did not own slaves – this is a period 
shortly after the arrival of the French Hugenots, who may not yet have accumulated slaves by that 
point.  15
50,000 vines). By 1700 a small rightward shift in the average area of land cultivated 
indicates that the industry gradually became established. However, by 1731, once the 
impact of slave labour had been cemented, it is clear that a certain group of farmers was 
able to establish excessively large areas under cultivation (with about 100,000 vines 
each). Yet, the mode is similar to 1700, suggesting that the average wine farmer’s area 
under cultivation remained largely unchanged over the period. However, by 1757 (with 
the upper tail undiminished), the mode shifts to the right, suggesting that slave labour 
also had a mild impact on ‘average’ wine farmers. Nevertheless, a clear elite emerged 
along the dimensions of both slavery and vine cultivation across a similar time period. 
This is evidenced in the strong relationship between these measures over this period in 
Table 3.  
 
Figure 4B adds to this picture by considering the distribution of wine produced. The 
maximum of the distribution extends from less than 50 leaguers of wine in 1700 to 
beyond 150 leaguers of wine in 1773, indicating the expansion of production amongst 
the richest. Given that vine plantations did not expand at the same rate among the elite, 
it is evident that yields became progressively more efficient in the wine industry. It is 
furthermore evident that wine production became far more concentrated, with smaller 
proportions of farmers entering this industry. In 1700 only slightly more than 40 per 
cent of farmers do not produce wine. This figure increases, so that by 1773 in excess of 
80 per cent of farmers do not produce any wine. This suggests that an elite developed 
around wine production once economies of scale enabled large producers to dominate 
the industry, while the majority of the farming population became progressively 
excluded. While some smaller farmers did own slaves, the size of their farms or slave 
contingents were not large enough to exploit economies of scale. 
 
While the upper tail also shows some emergence in the wheat (Figure 5A) and cattle 
(Figure 6A) industries, by 1757 a substantial portion of the weight returns to the 
respective lower tails, suggesting that factors other than slave labour are at play here. It 
is particularly evident in Figure 6B that a distinct reversal in cattle breeding emerges: 
1731 proves to be stochastically dominant, while all subsequent years are dominated by 
even 1700. This proves the diversion from cattle rearing as the wine industry emerged. 
Wheat’s (Figure 5B) reversion is not as clear as for cattle, with particularly the upper 
tail still growing larger by 1773. This indicates that some spill-over effects from the 
wine industry were indeed noticeable, particularly for large elitist farmers. Contrary to 
the original Engermann-Sokoloff conjecture, it is evident that the elite could also build 
their fortunes on the back of grains. However, the evidence suggests that this resulted 
from a spillover from the wine industry, rather than being a catalyst for elite formation. 
7 Conclusions 
The Cape Colony of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries shows that severe and 
persistent inequality may emerge even without the particular set of preconditions 
prescribed by the original endowments-inequality hypothesis. Instead, the production 
method (in this case, wage versus slave labour) of the dominant industry is posited here 
as a mechanism which drives inequality in a newly settled society.  
 
The Cape Colony provides a unique case study of a region where high inequality 
persisted, but which was neither located in the tropics, nor had any meaningful mineral 
deposits (diamonds and gold further inland would only be discovered roughly two  16
centuries after the arrival of Europeans). Van Riebeeck’s plan for agricultural 
production at the Cape Colony was based on a European blueprint – by all expectations 
this should have resulted in small scale farming, with low levels of concentration and 
inequality, as emerged in North America. This did not materialise, both as a result of 
harsh conditions and a shortage of capital and labour. The French settlers of 1688 were 
viticulturalists. Finding the area conducive to wine making (and supported by a large 
local market of travelling sailors and soldiers and the VOC’s desire to compete with 
French wine exports), viticulture soon became the dominant industry at the Cape. 
 
Soon after the arrival of the Huguenots, slave labour was encouraged while wage labour 
(European immigration) declined. (While slaves were already imported since 1658, the 
first slaves were mostly used by the Company). Theoretically we posit that two factors 
might drive this – the demand for Cape wine (both domestically and abroad) and greater 
economies of scale in production that could be utilized in viticulture relative to 
livestock. The slave population on the farms rose rapidly after 1717, when the Council 
of Policy at the Cape officially requested slave imports rather than European 
immigration. 
 
Our quantitative results show that by the middle of the century, a group of wealthy 
farmers had indeed emerged, owning large farms and many slaves and realizing 
economies of scale. Small-scale viticulture had declined, with poor farmers substituting 
wine for other crops, or moving into the interior. Of greater relevance for the Engerman-
Sokoloff hypothesis, this production method (slave labour instead of wage labour) may 
have been transferred to other crops (especially wheat). Whereas they argue that crops 
like wheat or barley did not allow slaves to be profitably used, we show that the 
introduction of wine-making at the Cape shifted the production function of both wine 
and wheat production to become more slave intensive, supporting a growing elite.  
 
The elite could now influence economic and political policy in accordance with their 
wishes. The political protests of the Patriots movement in the 1770s provide some 
evidence to support the discontentment of the small farmers against the institutions 
imposed by the elite. These institutions would change slowly, even after the British took 
over the governance of the Cape in 1795 and again in 1806. Although debatable, one 
could argue that the discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1885) reinforced these 
institutions, again because of the production method and economies of scale of the (now 
newly) dominant industries. Indeed, modern-day South Africa’s economy is 
characterized by one of the highest Gini coefficients internationally, which is reinforced 
by high levels of industrial concentration and a strong union contingent that sees its role 
as protecting unskilled workers against the business elite. Yet, as we argue here, the 
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Knecht (wage) labour 
Production volume 
Average total costs 
Qs  Qk  Qe   20
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
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Year  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
1663  0.83 1.72 1.52 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  197.30 278.73  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1670  1.26 2.99 0.86 1.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1678  2.71 3.94 0.53 1.41 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.05 23.74  1.86 4.14 1.21 3.02 
1682  2.31 3.46 0.54 1.96 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 21.28 44.27  3.20 10.00  6.43 12.49 
1685  2.61 4.21 0.59 0.93 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 18.98 28.65  3.19 5.02 2.07 3.73 
1688  3.13 4.91 0.25 0.61 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  9.57 19.82  2.85 7.57 0.46 1.69 
1692  1.36 4.28 0.29 0.82 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 25.89 46.21  5.30 8.63 1.76 7.70 
1695  2.00 4.83 0.28 0.58 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.56 9.16 12.06 24.84  1.78 4.27 0.32 2.16 
1700  2.99 5.69 0.25 1.80 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.10 4.19 6.25 14.25 24.23  9.15 15.04  2.18 8.44 
1702  2.47 4.94 0.25 1.91 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 3.11 6.76 11.54 22.43  5.18 10.95  1.07 4.34 
1712  4.37 7.87 0.22 0.72 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.18 2.65 5.85 30.86 54.20  1.75 7.48 2.94 16.87 
1719  5.71 8.33 0.24 0.86 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.21 2.76 5.86 29.27 55.13  0.61 3.17 2.87 15.43 
1731  6.32 9.41 0.14 0.48 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22 2.87 7.22 29.28 62.49  3.10 12.99  4.71 18.57 
1738  6.99 9.72 0.18 0.60 0.14 0.35 0.09 0.28 0.06 0.24 1.44 4.56 23.06 61.12  1.91 8.29 3.75 19.58 
1741  6.00 9.86 0.16 0.59 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.23 1.36 5.03 38.18 103.43  2.70 13.13  3.98 20.55 
1752  4.23 7.24 0.07 0.37 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.16 2.90 7.46 21.66 62.35  1.33 6.87 3.30 16.26 
1757  5.36 8.01 0.10 0.39 0.10 0.31 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.19 3.32 9.21 13.17 42.71  0.40 2.53 2.03 11.97 
1762  5.12 7.80 0.10 0.38 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.18 2.50 8.39 18.85 56.93  0.48 4.69 2.32 13.62 
1773  5.65 8.93 0.06 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.21 4.65 14.62  20.74 58.20  0.05 0.93 1.33 9.61 
Total  4.94 8.17 0.17 0.79 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19 2.58 8.47 22.54 61.88  1.84 8.14 2.58 14.31 
 
Notes: Sourced from the opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, 
are included in the sample. Various definitions of elites* are depicted here, adapting the definition of Giliomee (2003). Each is a dummy variable with the 
relevant threshold number of slaves indicated above, and the descriptive statistics of these variables* are proportions. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
  
Cattle (head per farmer) 
 
Sheep per farmer 
 
Pigs per farmer 
 
Year  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Freq. 
1663 11.70  12.31  44.74  50.40  2.22  2.76  23 
1670 8.57  16.05  134.09  111.96  1.43  2.28  35 
1678 21.40  30.47  122.98  209.17  1.10  2.25  146 
1682 15.83  18.60  124.73  175.98  2.27  3.25  83 
1685 26.07  36.89  170.60  254.33  0.85  2.29  85 
1688 20.34  31.94  239.26  390.69  1.09  2.23  68 
1692 22.77  45.96  213.00  491.44  0.62  2.09  222 
1695 23.71  41.67  145.03  351.66  1.93  4.31  268 
1700 35.08  50.81  192.73  441.58  1.38  4.04  271 
1702 37.01  63.79  201.20  534.24  1.11  3.10  336 
1712 42.76  63.08  281.54  446.70  0.58  2.60  404 
1719 39.09  55.82  162.28  333.21  2.59  5.70  407 
1731 42.32  59.20  218.54  300.28  1.50  5.81  568 
1738 49.35  79.79  221.65  349.73  1.36  6.59  685 
1741 41.53  72.23  193.04  335.65  0.91  4.99  759 
1752 29.24  53.36  158.84  258.98  0.47  3.66  595 
1757 27.81  44.65  150.47  232.83  0.40  3.73  884 
1762 22.87  38.10  135.94  244.57  0.43  4.55  962 
1773 23.71  38.92  177.29  284.24  0.31  3.84  1129 
Total 32.19  54.76  180.52  328.05  0.90  4.49  7930 
 
Notes: Sourced from the opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, 
are included in the sample. 
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Table 3: OLS estimates of the composition of the slave labour force (dependent variable: number of slaves per farming household) 
  Pooled  1663  1670  1678  1682  1685  1688  1692  1695  1700  1702  1712 
Wine  2.546                0.000  1.790  0.762  3.382 
  (12.18)**                (0.06)  (2.25)*  (1.14)  (5.30)** 
Wheat reaped  2.158  -0.032    2.690  1.898  3.387  0.627  -1.150  -0.110  1.489  0.852  1.707 
  (10.82)**  (0.50)    (1.35)  (1.82)  (1.66)  (0.35)  (1.45)  (0.08)  (1.81)  (1.00)  (3.66)** 
Cattle  1.532  -0.896  -1.405  2.035  4.816  1.856  3.246  0.590  4.878  2.974  0.834  0.754 
  (7.28)**  (0.71)  (0.87)  (2.11)*  (2.19)*  (1.62)  (1.78)  (1.05)  (3.67)**  (3.69)**  (1.33)  (1.30) 
Sheep  1.179  6.746  5.179  0.801  0.885  0.809  1.768  1.592  0.381  1.001  1.364  2.061 
  (5.03)**  (1.25)  (2.13)*  (1.33)  (0.97)  (1.31)  (2.50)*  (3.23)**  (0.75)  (2.28)*  (2.76)**  (4.24)** 
Pigs  0.678  -0.536  -0.345  1.829  -0.091  0.501  0.431  2.696  0.021  0.151  1.262  0.556 
  (3.70)**  (0.62)  (0.30)  (1.88)  (0.16)  (0.36)  (0.37)  (2.14)*  (0.07)  (0.40)  (2.57)*  (1.26) 
Barley reaped  0.458      -1.017  -1.146  -0.353  0.818  1.243  -1.014  0.258  0.570  0.511 
  (3.14)**      (0.58)  (1.85)  (0.19)  (0.09)  (2.86)**  (0.56)  (0.70)  (0.78)  (1.44) 
Rye reaped  -0.243      -1.664  0.027  -0.953  -0.853  0.006  -0.678  -0.472  -0.126  0.464 
  (1.50)      (1.62)  (0.09)  (0.89)  (0.80)  (0.03)  (1.21)  (1.81)  (0.76)  (1.40) 
Constant  4.936  3.531  1.425  3.570  4.273  3.190  3.859  1.611  2.604  3.069  2.465  3.370 
  (76.32)**  (1.19)  (1.32)  (7.63)**  (4.02)**  (6.12)**  (2.53)*  (5.69)**  (7.12)**  (9.85)**  (11.31)**  (17.62)** 
Observations  7930  23  35  146  83  85  68  222  268  271  336  404 
R-squared  0.50  0.32  0.30  0.30  0.46  0.34  0.46  0.53  0.62  0.69  0.64  0.71 
Robust t statistics in parentheses                     
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%                   
Notes: Own estimates from the opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are 
included in the sample. The dependent variable is the total number of slaves per farming household (it is not scaled nor centered). The explanatory variables are scaled and 
centered by the standard deviation and mean of the pooled sample, so that coefficients represent the number of slaves associated with a standard deviation change in 
production across the period, controlling for other forms of production. Estimates are not deemed to be causal but represent partial correlations between slave usage and 
production methods, taking into account that slaves worked on farms with other forms of production. Fixed effects estimates are similar to pooled OLS estimates, but are 
omitted because the panel constructed from this data has not been verified by genealogical research. 
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Table 4: OLS estimates of the composition of the slave labour force (dependent variable: number of slaves per farming household) 
  1719  1731  1738  1741  1752  1757  1762  1773 
Wine  4.127  4.627  6.916  5.869  2.855  3.176  2.346  1.701 
  (4.38)**  (7.88)**  (7.87)**  (7.00)**  (7.46)**  (10.54)**  (6.86)**  (8.02)** 
Wheat Reaped  2.550  1.582  3.232  1.515  3.257  3.211  2.460  3.627 
  (3.58)**  (2.42)*  (6.00)**  (5.49)**  (9.68)**  (7.02)**  (7.95)**  (8.62)** 
Cattle  1.794  0.272  0.966  0.772  1.681  1.363  1.732  1.915 
  (2.91)**  (0.40)  (1.61)  (1.34)  (3.31)**  (2.21)*  (2.20)*  (2.56)* 
Sheep  -0.278  1.993  0.610  1.491  1.027  2.139  1.822  0.619 
  (0.39)  (2.65)**  (0.70)  (1.67)  (1.86)  (3.43)**  (2.68)**  (1.07) 
Pigs  0.403  0.938  -0.236  1.051  -0.295  -0.142  1.082  0.339 
  (0.87)  (3.64)**  (0.41)  (1.69)  (0.67)  (0.22)  (4.79)**  (0.72) 
Barley Reaped  0.232  0.561  0.434  0.410  -0.291  -0.101  0.543  -0.364 
  (0.65)  (1.71)  (0.84)  (1.14)  (0.95)  (0.45)  (2.21)*  (0.48) 
Rye Reaped  2.280  0.099  -0.139  -0.416  0.087  0.332  0.930  0.685 
  (1.87)  (0.47)  (0.26)  (0.79)  (0.37)  (0.50)  (2.92)**  (0.84) 
Constant  5.293  5.484  7.502  6.279  4.322  5.910  6.110  5.812 
  (13.79)**  (23.54)**  (25.51)**  (22.21)**  (25.12)**  (24.42)**  (27.61)*
*  (18.40)** 
Observations  407  568  685  759  595  884  962  1129 
R-squared  0.54  0.63  0.56  0.59  0.65  0.55  0.54  0.45 
Robust t statistics in parentheses                 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%               
Notes: Own estimates from the opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are 
included in the sample. The dependent variable is the total number of slaves per farming household (it is not scaled nor centered). The explanatory variables are scaled and 
centered by the standard deviation and mean of the pooled sample, so that coefficients represent the number of slaves associated with a standard deviation change in 
production across the period, controlling for other forms of production. Estimates are not deemed to be causal but represent partial correlations between slave usage and 
production methods, taking into account that slaves worked on farms with other forms of production. Fixed effects estimates are similar to pooled OLS estimates, but are 
omitted because the panel constructed from this data has not been verified by genealogical research.   24
Figure 2A: Number of slaves required per standard deviation of production  
 
Notes: Own calculations from the opgaafrollen. Standard deviations of each production type are from the 
pooled sample. Estimates are obtained from Tables 3 and 4. All negative values were statistically 
insignificant. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one agricultural input or producing at 
least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 
 
Figure 2B: Number of slaves required per standard deviation of production  
 
Note: Own calculations from the opgaafrollen. This figure is based on similar estimates to those depicted in 
Figure 2a. However, standard deviations are calculated for each year rather than across the entire period. 
All negative values were statistically insignificant. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 
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Figure 3A: Distribution of total number of slaves owned per farmer – various years 
 
Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 
 
Figure 3B: Cumulative distribution of total number of slaves owned per farmer – various years 
Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 
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Figure 4A: Distribution of number of vines planted per farmer– various years 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 
 
Figure 4B: Cumulative distribution of leaguers of wine production per farmer – various years 
 
Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample.   27
Figure 5A: Distribution of muids of wheat reaped per farmer – various years 
 
Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 
 
Figure 5B: Cumulative distribution of muids of wheat reaped per farmer– various years 
 
Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 
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Figure 6A: Distribution of head of cattle owned per farmer – various years 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 
 
Figure 6B: Cumulative distribution of head of cattle owned per farmer – various years 
 
Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample.   29
Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of number of Knechts (European wage labour) employed per 




Notes: Own calculations from opgaafrollen. Only farmers, defined as households owning at least one 
agricultural input or producing at least one agricultural output, are included in the sample. 